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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

CONRAD H. MORBY,
Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

7698
WALTER LA\\'RENCE ROGERS,

Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, on March 22,
1951 (R 42) in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant v\r alter Lawrence Rogers (appellant here)
for the sum of $10,633.45 and costs $79.80. The judg..
ment became final for purposes of appeal when on
April 18, 1951, appellant's motion for a judgment not.
withstanding the verdict, or in lieu for a new trial filed
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March 31, 1951 (R 43) was denied (R 43, 48). Notice
of appeal was fil~d May 15, 1951 (R 49). The .appeal
is from the judgment and the order refusing a judgment
in defendant's favor or a new trial.
The ease is one in tort for damages for the death
of plaintiff's son Gary Morby, which resulted from a
collision between ~a bicycle ridden by young Morby and
an automobile driven by the appellant; on April 29,
1951, near 5140 South 13th East in Salt Lake County,
Utah.
There were two defendants at the trial, the appellant and his wife, but at the end of plaintiff's evidence the tri,al court directed a dismissal in favor of
the defendant wife (R 8 and 257). The appeal is by
defendant Walter Lawrence Rogers only.
THE FACTS
There were no eye witnesses to this accident, except app·ellant and his wife (R 181). There was the
testimony of other ·witnesses but none of them saw
the happening of the accident.
Thirteenth East Street runs north and south and
it is str~aight for a long distance. From about 56th
South straight north on 13th East Street the grade
is slightly descending (R 79) and the point of the accident was about at the bottom of the grade. From that
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point on gomg north the grade is slightly ascending
(R 94). Thirteenth East Street is a two lane hard
surfaced high,Yay and in the vicinity where the accident happened it is approximately 18 feet, wide with
six feet dirt shoulders on either side. Rogers traveled
north on the east side of the highway (R 101). He
says a center line \Yas marked on the road but it was
somewhat faint. Other witnesses testified there was
no such mark. In the vicinity of where the accident
took place an irrigation ditch or creek about ten feet
wide parallels the highway on the west side (R 157).
Practically opposite the point of the accident over this
ditch is a wooden bridge leading into a lane going west
across some farm land.
There are no cross roads nor any intersection at
the point of the accident and there is nothing to show
the bridge leading into the lane from either direction,
unless a careful observation is made (R 107).
Rogers was 65 years old .at the time of the trial
and 64 at the time of the accident (R 98). He formerly had operated a street car and driven street motor
buses for the traction company and Salt Lake City
Lines in Salt Lake City, driving a motor bus for ten
or twelve years. He had retired at the age of sixty
and at the time of the trial had been retired for five
years (R 98). He had operated an automobile twentyfive years.
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The Rogers live at about 23rd East and 94th South
In .Salt Lake County (R 95), some six or seven miles
from where the accident took place (R 96). The day
of the accident he and Mrs. Rogers, in the automobile
he was driving, entered upon 13th East Street from the
east .and turned north on that street at 94th South Street
(R99), and from there continued north to the point of
the accident (R 99).
South of the point of the accident Rogers noticed
a boy on ~a bicycle in front of his automobile (R 102)
traveling in the same direction as the automobile (R
79-80). At about 200 feet behind the bicycle Rogers
honked his horn (R 78). Rogers and the cyclist were
both on the right hand side of the road proceeding
north (R 79), the boy being on the extreme east side
of the hard surface of the highway (R 87). The horn
was sounded ag.ain when the car was about 20 feet
from the boy and at a time when the automobile had
started to move over to the left to pass, but neither
time did the hoy indicate he had heard the horn (R
79-80). Rogers turned to pass him, giving him plenty
of room so the car could pass in safety and when the
car got "around up a little ways", the boy cut sharply
in front of the car, the front wheel came in contact
with the right front bumper of the automobile (R 108)
and the bicycle and the boy were tip·ped over (R 81).
Before the boy on the bicycle made the turn referred
to, he was on the right or east side of the highway
and Rogers had gotten on the west side of the middle
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line (R 109). Rogers swung his car to the left and
"at that" he was almost to the' edge of the canal and
''in we went'' ( R 82). Rogers applied his brakes ''a
little" but he did not want to "run over" the boy so
he pulled his car quickly to the left. Rogers states
that when he first honked his horn he estimated the
speed of his vehicle at about three times the speed of
the bicycle (R 103) and said he was going about twenty
miles per hour at the time the accident occurred and
at about fifteen at the time he went into the creek (R
86). When the car came to rest it was pointed north
and was at the bottom of the creek. Evidently the
creek is about the width of the car and the top~ of the'
car was about level with the top of the bank of the
creek ( R 85, 111).
Rogers got out of the car and went to the boy.
The boy was lying on his right side astride the bicycle,
the bicycle somewhat on top of him (R 88) and he
was lying toward the west side of the highway about
three feet from the left edge, according to Rogers (R
114). Rogers stated the boy's feet were about three
feet from the left edge of the highway and his head
extended toward the north and east (R 114, 117). The
bicycle was taken to the side of the road and the boy's
body Wtas also moved to the side of. the highway. Some
boy came along later and rode the bicycle away (R
81, 121). The p·oint where the boy made the sudden
turn was about opposite the bridge across the creek
and apparently the boy had intended turning to cross
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
the bridge (R 107).
The boy never gave any signal of his intention
to turn nor did he look around before he turned (R 147).
The witness Erhenbach, a deputy sheriff at the
time of the accident, said he arrived at the scene of
the accident, that Rogers told him the approximate
point of impact was ''about right here''; that point was
two ·feet from the west edge of the tarred portion of
the highW1ay. Rogers was asked by this witness how
far away he was when he first "noticed there may be
an accident'' and he was shown a point 78 feet south
of the point of impact (R 154).
This witness stated he made some measurements
and that the rear end of the car was 27 feet eight
inches north of the north edge of the bridge and that
it was 42 feet from the place Rogers pointed out as
the point of impact. The automobile at that time was
in the creek. He also stated there was no indication
of b:vake marks; that Rogers stated to him he tried
to swing as far to the left as he could to avoid the
accident after the boy pulled over in front of him
(R 159, 160). The witness said he saw no evidence
of an abrupt turn. The witness further stated that
Rogers further told him he had been traveling 30 miles
per hour and at the time of the accident w:a.s going
ten miles per hour. The witness identified some photographs and said the rear mud guard on the bicycle
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was bent as shown in the picture; that some paint on
the mud guard was the same color as the paint on the
automobile (R 168) and that the bent mud guard was
the only damage appearing on the bicycle. The bicycle
was introduced in evidence by plaintiff and in court
this witness could not point out the paint on the bicycle
after a thorough examination of a minute or so (R
189-190), although the bicycle had been kept unused
since the accident and without alteration (R 213, 227 ).
Two of the witnesses stated they were in .a truck
coming from the north and saw Rogers go into the
road, pick the boy up and carry him to the side of
the road and before he was moved it was their judgment the boy was lying just west of th~ center of the~
highway (R 233, 241).
Another witness Mrs. Rogers, for the defense, who
had been dismissed as a defendant, testified young
Morby gave no signal of his intention to turn, made
no observation before he turned and that he made a
sudden turn just as the automobile was to pass him and
about three feet to the boy's left and that when that
happened her husband turned to the left in an attempt
to avoid young Morby and that the car then went on
into the ditch (R 266, 277). She also testified that
until he suddenly turned young Morby was at all times
on the east half of the highway (R 264-5-6-).
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ber 4, 1949 (R 253) so that on the day of the ,accident
he was thirteen years six months and twenty-five days
old.
There was some evidence from which one could
infer that young Morby's clothes were torn and scuffed
up by the accident (R 251). The boy. had been delivering papers on a paper route that day substituting
for another carrier and from the evidence he was the
usual bright boy for his age, had ridden bicycles for ·
several years and had ridden in an automobile with
his father and mother on many occasions (Evidence
of Mr. and Mrs. Morby commencing R 210 and R 249).
This is a brief recapitulation of the evidence.

STATEMENT OF POINTS.
1. Appellant's motion for directed verdict or app·ellant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict should have been granted.
(a)

The appellant was not negligent.

(b) The plaintiff's decedent was negligent as
a matter of law and his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
(c) The last clear chance doctrine is not applicable to the facts of this case.
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2. The trial ·court made Improper rulings with
respect to evidence.

3. The trial court Inisdirected the jury.
(a) Instructions Nos. 3, 8, 9 and 10 were improper and there was no evidence to support them.
(b) Defendant's request No. 1 should have
been given.
(c)

Instructions Nos. 11 and 12 were rmpro-

(d)

Instruction No. 14 was Improper.

per.

ARGUMENT
Although our statement of points cover several subjects, yet some of them are related, and in the intereRt
of brevity and cohesiveness they can be discussed together in the same portions of this brief, and so we
will proceed in that fashion, under headings we think
appropriate:
The evidence of negligence (Point Ia).
There is nothing in this record, either by word
of mouth or physical facts that suggests this appellant
was in any wise negligent.
The greatest speed at which this automobile ever
traveled was thirty miles per hour. The highway was
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singularly free from traffic ; it was a good, dry road,
ample in width, and a bright sunny day was in progress. Neither court nor jury could conclude this speed
constituted negligence.
The appellant observed this boy on the highw.ay
long before he reached the vicinity of the accident.
He obs~rved him constantly during the entire time when
he first saw him and the point at which the accident
took place. There was no reason for him not to observe him. No other vehicles were on the highway;
no cross roads were passed; the road was straight; the
weather was good and visibility clear. Appellant had
his eye on the boy during all this period. There is
no evidence to the contrary.
In passing the bicycle, the evidence is that the
appellant moved to the left side of the highway; gave
the deceased plenty of room, signalled with his horn
of his intention to pass the boy. When in the act of
passing and at a time when the decendent had given
no indication of any intention to turn or do anything
but pursue his peaceful way north on the east side of
the highway and without making any observations whatever, the boy suddenly and without any warning whatsoever, turned to the left and into the path the automobile was taking. There is no evidence to the contrary as to the suddenness of the turn and that it was
made without signal or warning.
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Plaintiff's theory is that both the bicycle and the
automobile were traveling in the same direction as
he charges in paragraph three of the complaint that
both vehicles were proceeding in a northerly direction.
It is also his theory that the bicycle was ahead of the
automobile as he charges in subparagraph (g) of paragraph 4 of the complaint that the defendants ''having
observed the deceased on the highway ahead'', and also
that the automobile overtook the bicycle because the
same subparagrap-h charges that defendants failed to
use care in ''overtaking the vehicle of deceased who
was lawfully using said road.''
Now, the evidence is without dispute that the accident took place on the west half or southbound lane
of this highway. The boy's body was to the west of
the center of the highway, lying in a northeast-southwest direction with his feet to the southwest. The automobile was in the ditch on the west side of the highway. There is nothing in the evidence to show that the
boy was travelling anywhere but north on the right
side of the road until he turned.
So, if we ·rely on the evidence and do. not go off
into some wild theory or into conjecture the only thing
left is to conclude that the accident happ_ened ast appellant and the other eye witness said it did; i.e. while
the automobile was in the .act of passing, the boy made
a sudden turn into its path.
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If one is going to go on the theory that oeing out
1n an automobile on a clear day with little traffic is
in and of itself a dangerous operation and that one
doing so proceeds at his own risk, and is an insurer of
the safety of another on a bicycle he is about to pass
then negligence exists here. But such is not the law,
and necessarily could not be.
Duties on the highway are correlative, and the ap- ·
pellant had the right to assume until the contrary
appeared that the boy on the road ahead of him would
obey the rules of the road and permit the passing of
the bicycle by the automobile; that the boy would remain in his own lane of traffic until some indication
of a contrary intention took place and that the boy
would not change from one lane and make a turn without giving .some indication of his intention so to do,
by looking and signalling.
(

Testing the appellant's conduct in the light of all
of these circumstances can lead to but one conclusion-the appellant was in no wise negligent, and the
accident was caused by circumstances entirely beyond
his control.
The law does not expect superhuman conduct; the
test is reasonable care in view of all the circumstances.
Hindsight might dictate a different course of condu~t,
but the difficulty of that is that hindsight does not
eliminate the knowledge after acquired that the boy
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would and did turn. As the events leading up to this
accident unfolded, under the evidence in this case there
was nothing that this appellanJt did or did not do that
violated the rule of ordinary care.
True, the appellant did not avoid hitting the boy.
·The accident happened. But this accident was not the
result of anything this appellant did or did not do. He
and another witness, his wife, who at the time she
testified was not a defendant in this action, both testified the boy made a sudden turn when the automobile
was less than twenty feet away (Mrs. Rogers said less
than ''two' car lengths or a little less'' R 264-5-6) .. Twice,
in anwer to questions submitted by plaintiff's counsel the
appellant stated things "happened pretty fast" (R 89,
132). Rogers said he had about caught up with the boy
when the boy started to turn (R 107), that th~ car was
just turning around him when the boy started to turn
and the boy was on Rogers' right and( the car p;artially
on the left side of the highway at the time of the turn
(R 105) and that the car travelled four or five feet
from the time the boy started to turn to the time of
the collision (R 108). Rogers stated the boy ~as going
right straight ahead until he started to turn (R 87).
Under these circumstances we fail to see any evidence of negligence on the part of the appellant which
proximately caused this accident.
The instructions on negligence (Point 3a).

By instruction No. 3 the trial court stated the
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charged negligence to be five in number (R 25). They
are just a rehash of the pleadings and amount to nothing more than reading plaintiff's complaint, a practice
condemned by this court. Shields vs. Utah Light q
Traction Co., 105 Pac. 2d 347, 99 Utah 307. There is
no evidence to support .any of them, except that the
appellant did not avoid this accident. And as to that
it is not negligence to fail to avoid an accident unless
it be in the power of app·ellant to do so. The instruction was entirely improper and could lead the jury
to believe that they should consider those i terns in deciding whether ·or not the appell,ant was negligent. The
only thing which could result was confusion and misunderstanding.
Instructions No. 8, 9 and 10 are equally at fault.
These and instruction No. 3 in the particulars noted
were excepted to (R 289, et seq) with great particular-

ity.
Instruction No. 8 has to do with keeping the car
under control; instruction No. 9 has to do with speed;
and instruction No. 10 has to do with keeping a lookout. It is the appellant's contention there was no basis
in the evidence for a charge to the jury on any of these
propositions. The car was under control at all times;
there was no evidence of any excessive speed, in fact
all the evidence is that it was extremely moderate, and
certainly there is no evidence that this appellant at
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any time failed to keep a lookout for

th~l

cyclist.

The evidence is the speed was reduced and never
was exc.essive, and to say there is evidence that the
appellant failed to keep a lookout is to fly in the face
of all the evidence, because all of it is that he saw the
bicycle at all times and drove off the highway and into
a deep canal or creek in an attempt to avoid what the
decedent was doing.
These instructions were bad because they had to do
with claimed negligence about which there was no evidence. This too has been condemned by this court.
Shields vs. Traction Company, supra.
Negligence of the deceased (Point 1b).

This particular phase of the case is raised on this
appeal in several ways. It is raised by the motion for
a directed verdict, by the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, by the exceptions to the
court's instruction No. 12 (R 27) and the r~efusal of
the court to give appellant's request No. 1 (R 37).
The evidence is without dispute that the deceased
made a sudden turn out of the lane of traffic in which
he was pToceeding and into another lane, and that he
did so without signal and without making any observation. That this contributed to the accident cannot
be gainsaid. A signal would have warned appellant of
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the intention to turn and a casual observation would
have informed the deceased that he could not turn without grave and imminent peril, and an accident would
have been prevented.
This .action by the decease contravened Section 577-133, Utah code. Under that section no turn nor any
movement right or left ·can be made until such turn
or movement can be made with reasonable safety, and
no such turn or movement shall be made if other traffic may be affected without a proper signal given for
at least 100 feet before the turn.
Section 57-7-148 states:

''Every person riding a bicycle upon a roadway shall be subject to the provisions of this act
applicable to the driver of a vehicle except as to
special regulations in this act and except as to
those provisions of this jact which by their nature
can have no application.''
Now, it is common knowledge that children ride· bicycles and particularly .children ten years and older.
Everyone sees them riding bicycles. More children ride
bicycles on the streets and highways than grownups.
These are matters of constant observation. The court
must conclude that the legislature in enacting Section·
57-7-148 with .respect to bicycles and persons riding
them appreciated this f1a.ct, and that it intended that
children operating bicy:cles on the public highways
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should be governed by the general provisions of Chap. .
ter 7, Title 57, Utah code, being the traffic rules and
regulations. When bicycles are being ridden on the
highway they are a p·art and parcel of the traffic operating thereover, and those sections enacted to regulate
and control traffic operate on bicycles.
So we assert that Section 57-7-133 applies to children ri<llng bicycles.
In construing other sections of Chapter 7 of Title
57, this court in North v. C·artw'fiight, 229 Pacific (2)
871, said:
''These statutes were promulgated for the
protection of the public and to safeguard property, life and limb of persons using the highways from accidents of the type here involved.
Violations of these statutes then constitutes negligence in law. This doctrine of the law has heen
steadfastly adhered to by this court and generally in other courts throughout the United States
* * * 'When a standard of duty or care is fixed
by law or ordinance, and such law or ordinance
has reference to the safety of life, limb or property, then, as a matter of necessity, a violation
of such law or ordinance constitutes neligence.' ''
It is our contention that 57-7-133 applies to the
deceased and that he was hound to obey it, notwithstanding his age being slightly under fourteen. We
cite Graha»n v. Johnson, 166 Pacific (2) 230, 109 Utah
346, where a minor, thirteen years old, was injured by
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an automobile and this court, in holding him negligent
as a matter of .law said:
''We start with not only the assumption but
the knowledge that Gary was negligent in playing in the street in violation of Sec. 5321, Revised ordinances, Salt Lake City, 1944, which
provides in effect that it sh:all be unlawful for
any person to obstruct any street by playing
games thereon, such as the game of ball, or
annoy or obstruct free travel of any vehicle."
Section 57-7-133 was designed for the protection
of the deceased in riding a bicycle on the highway as
well .as other traffic thereon, and the results of this
accident and his failure to obey the statute graphically illustrates that it was so designed.
This is not any new or novel proposition. Other
courts have passed upon the question. We call this
court's attention to Sagar v. Joseph Burnett Company,
190 Atlantic 258, where the Supreme Court of Connecticut had before it a case involving a boy ten years
old riding a bicycle, with a companion on the handlebars, who came into collision with an automobile driven
by the defendant. The boy was making a left turn at
an intersection and in doing so did not keep to th'b
right of the center of the intersection but cut the intersection. While so doing a collision between the bicycle and the defendant's automobile took place, causing injuries to the boy. The Supreme Court of Connecticut said :
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'' * * * The trial court referred to the statute
(General Statutes, Cu. Supp. 1935, Sec. '636c)
'which provides that when the operator of 'any
vehicle - and that includes a bicycle - is making a left turn at the intersection of two public
highways he must at all times keep his vehicle
to the right of the center point of the intersec-tion,' and charged that 'a violation of this
statute - is negligence in itself. Accordingly,
if you should find that the plaintiff did violate
this statute then you must conclude that he was
negligent in that particular, an·d if you conclude that he violated that statute or that he
was negligent in any other particular and that
such violation or such negligence was a substantial factor in producing his own injuries, then
you have found that he was guilty of contributory negligence. * * *' Just previously the
court had called attention to the jage of the plaintiff and had charged that his conduct so far .as
concerned his claimed negligence was to be measured by that which is reasonably to be expected
of children of similar age, judgment :and experience. Marfyak v. New England Transportation Co., 120 Conn. 46, 50, 179 A. 9. The plaintiff claims that the same test should be applied
in determining whether violation of the statute
by him would constitute negligence and assigns
error in the failure to so charge specifically in
that connection. Reading as a whole the charge
as to contributory negligence, we consider it
very likely that the jury may have been led
thereby to apply the qualifications as to age,
judgment and experience to the plaintiff's .alleged conduct in violating the statute as well
as to his conduct in other respects, and, if so,
the plaintiff certainly would have no reason to
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complain.
''That aside, however, we find no justification for the application of this qualification to
the effect of violation of the statute as negligence per se. Frisbie v. Schinto, 120 Conn. 412,
415, 181 A. ·535. Neither the statute nor any of
our decisions under it suggest such an exception
to its operation. The terms of the statute are
clear and precise as to the course to be pursued ·
by a vehicle in turning left in an intersection· and
which mai, be expected· to be taken by others.
Andrew v. White Bus Line Corp., 115 Conn.
464, 466, 161 A. 792; Murphy v. Way, 107 Conn.
633, 637, 141 A. 858. 'It 1s the duty of the courts
to apply it in accord with the intent expressed
in the act, without limitation or exception or
extension.' Washburn v. LaMay, 116 C-onn. 576,
578, 165 A. 791, 792.
0

,

''As we stated in Murphy v. Way, supra,
107 Conn. 633, at page 638, 141 A. 858, the purposes of the statute would be subverted if the
standards of conduct prescribed by it could be
subjected to exceptions based upon the judgment of the individual user of the highway,
and this consideration would be conspicuously
applicable in the case of such a user whose capacity to exercise judgment. was affected by
immaturity and inexperience. While the incapacities of youth are to be accorded due weight
in matters of intent .and criminal responsibility,
it is not· unreasonable or unfair to hold applicable to all operators of vehicles the rule that
he who violates one of these statutory mandates does so at his own risk. Murphy v. Way,
supra.
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"Although most of the states reg,ard immaturity in measuring the conduct of children
in determining questions of negligence (45 C. J.
p. 998), no case has come to our attention in
which children have been excepted from the
operation of the rule which most states have
long applied (45 C. J. 720) that violation of a
statutory duty constitutes negligence. On the
other hand, they have been denied recovery repeatedly for injuries of which the p·roximate
cause was coasting upon a public way in violation of law. Wright v. Salzberger & Son, 63 Cal.
App. 450, 218 P. 785, 63 Cal. App. 450, 218 P.
785' ', and other cases cited.

In the case of Brown v. Daley, 173 N. E. 545, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had before
it a case involving injuries to two children, five and
seven years .old, growing out of a coasting accident.
The defendant contended the accident took place on a
street where coasting was prohibited and the Massaehusetts court held that if the accident did take place on
that street no recovery could be had for the death of
the two children because the negligence of the children
would bar recovery. The court, however, held that there
was a fact question present as to whether or not the
children were actually coasting on the street at the 'time
of the accident and stated that because the jury had
heard the evidence and viewed the p·remises the jury
verdict would not be disturb-ed.
Without specific reference to this statute, Section
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fie (2) 640, states:

'' * * *

A person making a turn out of one
line across another line of traffic is the one who
first knows that he intends to change his direction from that in which it would otherwise be
presumed that he intended to eontinue. Any
person traveling in the line of traffic which the
direction changer intends to cross can only be
apprised of the latter's intention to change direction on signal or upon seeing him start to
make the change. It is not as if there were a
telephonic system between the brain of the direction changer .and those who :are to be affected.
Therefore, the man who makes the change of
direction owes the duty of looking before he
makes it and of signaling clearly and timely,
and of making the change sufficiently slowly
so as to give time for other drivers who may be
aff ecterll by it to be alerted and to react to that
signal.''

This decedent did nothing, under the evidence in
this case, except turn. He did not look, he gave no indication of his intention to turn. When the automobile
was a short distance behind him and to his side he
suddenly turned and continued into that turn until a
collision occurred. His negligence continued up to the
very time of the accident; his sudden turn without a
warning or any observation in the path of onrushing
danger brought about this unfortunate accident. There
seems to us no question but that that is the case here.
The motion for a directed verdict should have been
granted and on the motion being presented the court
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should have set the verdict aside and entered judgment
for the defendant, no cause of action.
The instructions on the negligence of tbe deceased (Points
3b, 3c).
(i) Appellant's Requested Instruction No.1.

In the event there may have been a question of
fact in the case, appellant submitted his instruction No.
1 to the trial court, which the trial court refused to
give.

This request (R 37) incorporates in it the ·duties of
a traveler on the highway who is about to make a turn
and actually turns from the lane in which he is riding
across another lane of traffic in order to reach a point
off the highway. As heretofore pointed out, the evidence in this case is that the decedent while going north
on the east side of the highway turned to his left across
another lane of the highway and under all the evidence
it is apparent that he intended to turn into a farm lane
leading from the highway to the west side. This lane
crossed a bridge over 'a creek which was also on the
west side of the highway. The instruction ·calls
the attention of the jury to three things which
such a traveler must do before making, or while
in the act of making, such a turn. They are: (1} That
before making the turn he must indicate his intention
to do so by giving visible signals; (2) That he cannot
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make the turn unless he can do so with safety, and (3)
That it is his duty to make observations in order to
ascertain whether or not he can make the turn with
safety. By the instruction it is left to the jury t~ determine whether or not Gary Morby failed to do any
of the things enumerated and the request was formulated on the theory that if there is jury question as to
what Morby did or failed to do yet the jurY, should be
appraised of what he was required to do in making such
a turn.
Under the statute, Section 57-7-133, it is perfectly ·
apparent that no turn should be made until it can be
made with reasonable safety; that no turn can be made,
if other traffic may be affected, without a proper signal
given indicating the intention to turn, and it necessarily
follows, that observations must be made in order to
determine whether or not a turn can be made with
safety and that one who makes a turn without making
observations cannot comply with the . requirements of
the statute and, therefore, on~ who fails to make such
observations is guilty of negligence, .as a matter of law.
It is our contention that even though the court should
determine that the question of Morby's negligence was
for the jury- to decide, yet an instruction informing the
jury of the decedent's duty in the language of this instruction, or some instruction in substance like it, should
have been given to the jury. Nowhere in any of the
court's instructions did the court include all the elements set forth in this request as applied to Gary
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Morby, and it is our contention in failing so to do the
trial court committed reversible error.
Ordinary common intelligence demands that a p·erson in the position of Gary Morby on this highway and
intending to make a turn to the left should do something to protect himself. He must do something to
ascertain whether or not the turn can be made with
safety and this, of course, requires observations, ;and
in addition he must give a signal of his intention to
turn if his turn will ·affect traffic. If ha makes a turn
without giving a signal he takes his chances because the
requirement of signaling is for his protection 'as well
as, others. Under the facts of this case, when this turn
was made or about to be made, there can be no question
but that other traffic would he and was affected, and
·seriously affected by the deceased's turn.
Irrespective of the statute., ordinary care would
dictate these very things. In the case cited and quoted
from above, i. e., Spackman v ..Carson, supra, this court,
without any reference to any statute and in discussing
what one should do who is about to change his course on
the highway, sets forth all the elements of this st-atute.
Gary M-orby was the only one who knew he intended to
turn. Gary Morby was the only one who could inform
himself as to what the conditions were. Gary Morby
was the only one who knew when he intended to turn
and in order to protect himself from injury or the loss
of his life, ordinary care dictated that he should look
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before he changed his course and that he should signal
if a turn would affect traffic and further that he should
not change his course unless he could negotiate his new
route with safety. No person on the highway could
possibly determine whether or not he could make a
turn in safety or determine whether or not traffic would
be affected by his turning or whether or not a signal
was: required unless he looked to see what other traffic
was on the road. Defendant's proposed instruction No.
1 makes the test that if Gary Morby "failed to give a
signal'' * * * "or failed to make observations as to
whether or not a turn could be made with sa£ety'', he
lS guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
The minimum requirements under our statute of
any p·erson u~ing the highway under the circumstances
in this case would be that he look and signal and if he
fails to do ~ither he is guilty of negligence as a matter
of law.
Although we contend that a 13 year old boy riding
a bicycle on a public highway is bound absolutely by
the rules of the road as set forth in our argument commencing at page 17 of this brief, we would like to point
out to this court that Gary Morby's judgment as such
13 year old is never involved in this case and cannot
be tested by the standard of 13 year old hoys of similar
capacity unless he has some basis upon w·hic.h to form
that judgment, that is, wnless he looks around him on
the highw'ay to see what the situation is at the time he
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intends to make a tu~rn; and further we contend that
the jury should have been informed that these mini. .
mum requirements must be met before they ·can test
\vhether or not Gary Morby, as a 13 year old boy,
acted with due care, and if they find that he failed to
meet these minimum requirements he was guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
If there is a question of fact in this case as to
what Gary Morby did or did not do, it was reversible
error to refuse to give this instruction.
(ii) Instructions No.'s 11 and 12.

Appellant's first objection to instruction No. 12 is
that the statute, Section 57-7-133, and its fair construction, does not exempt a 13 year old boy because of his
'age when he is riding a bicycle on the highway from his
failure to abide by the rules of the road set up in that
statute. We have already argued that because Gary
Morby was on a bicycle, was a user of the highway on
such bicycle, that he is hound by the statute. In instructing the jury as the court did in instruction No. 12, that
the jury could consider the age of Gary Morhy in deciding whether or not he was negligent, the court violated the plain terms of the statute because this statute
was meant to cover Gary Morby and set an absolute
standa,rd of care for him while he was riding the bicycle on 13th East on the day in question and Gary
Morby's conduct should have been tested against that
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standard of care without reference to his age.
We helieve the foregoing argument in respect to the
negligence of Gary Morby and the law 'applicable thereto· which we have set out in our argument is conclusive
as to the deceased's negligence in this case, and this i~
true whether or not this court feels there is a question
of fact involved. Notwithstanding the foregoing argument, however, if this court feels that Gary Morby's
conduct should be tested by what reasonably prudent
boys of his age and capacity would have done and if
this court feels that an appropriate instruction in this
regard should have been given to the jury, then we
submit the following argument which points out the errors in the instruction that the trial court g:ave to the
jury on the trial of this cause.
The trial court sets forth in instruction No. 11 the
duties required of an adult in making a turn upon a public highway and they are : To give a visible signal of
his intention, to turn, not to make such turn unless he
can do so with ·s,afety, and to look and see whether or
not such turn or change of lane can be made with safety.
Then in instruction No. 12 the trial court states that
a boy of 13 years of age is not held to the standards
of care and eaution of 1an adult person, and goes on and
states that as a matter of law it would he negligence
for all_ adult to make a turn in violation of the duties
as set forth above without indicating by 'a proper signal
his intention so to do; but then, when the court instructs
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the jury as to the elements and circumstances that they
should consider in deciding whether or not a 13 year
old boy was guilty of negligen·ce, the only circumstance
the trial court put before the jury was whether ''a .reasonably prudent person of the ag-e of 1-3 would know and
appreciate the danger of. trying to make such a turn
without signaling.'' Nothing is· said about whether or
not a 13 year old boy is required to look, nothing is ·said
as to whether or not a 13 year old boy has to make a
turn in safety. The entire instruction deals only with
the appreciation of danger of turning without signaling.
Under this instruction the jury could find that Gary
Morby did not appreciate the danger of making 'a turn
without signaling and as a consequence was not negligent and did not, therefore, contribute to his own death,
and the jury could have so found irrespective of whether
or not it would have found Gary Morby, or any other
13 year ·old boy of like capacity, would have looked and
would :Q.ave refrained from turning because a turn could
not be made with reasonable safety. The measuring
stick under the instruction is whether or not a 13 year
old ·should have made the turn without giving a signal.
We insist that it should have also included whether or
not said 13 year old should have looked and should have
refrained from making a turn until it could have been
made with reasonable safety.
These omissions from the ·court's instruction No. 12
are doubly app,a,rent when compared with the elements
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set forth in instruction No. 11, supra. It is submitted
that the jury in eomparing these two successive instructions would necessarily conclude that although an adult
is held to the duty of looking to see whether or not a
turn can be made with safety and not turning unless
he ·can do so with s1a.fety, that a hoy of 13 years of age
is not held to such a duty, and that such duties are not
even matters for the jury to consider.
Whether a person, adult or child, aets as a reasonably pTudent person and whether a person meets the
standards of care required by the law should be determined by a consideration of .all of the circumstances o.f
the transaction. The only difference in the standard
of care between an adult and a child, in the absence of
an express statute setting the same standard for each,
is that the child is only held to the standard of conduct
of doing that which other children of the same age and
like capacity would have done under like circumstances.
As applied to this case, the requirement of looking to
determine the situation on the highway 1and· the requirement of turning with safety after having made such an
observation, are not eliminated from the case as a matter
of law merely because the deceased is a 13 year old boy.
These are elements by which the jury should have
judged whether or not Gary Morby acted ~a.s a reasonably prudent boy of his age and capacity would have
acted. The tri1al court should have so instructed the
jury and its failure so to instruct was prejudicial error.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
Errors in the admission of evidence (Point 2).

The matter about which we complain here can be
found at pages 154, 155 and 156 of the record. It all
started out when the witness Erlenbach stated, in 1answer
to a question, that
''Seventy-eight feet represents the course
the vehicle No.1 traveled according to Mr. Rogers
when I asked him how far away he was when he
first noticed there may be an accident, and that's
the point to which he took me and showed me.
From that point I taped it off with a tape.''
Some discussion went on between counsel and the witness, and then counsel, after referring to the point of
impact, asked

'' * * * about how far south of that point did
Mr. Rogers point out to you was the spot where
he first realized there was going to be an accident?''

An objection was made that the question did not contain the witness's .testimony, and the court misunderstood the objection as 1a reading of the transc-ript will
show. Then there was some further discussion and coun.:.
sel then asked
''And pointed out to you the place where he
first realized that an accident w·as goilng to occur?" (R 155)
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which was objected to as leading and suggestive, which
objection was overruled, and then the next question
contained this
''Will you point to the spot * * * at which
Mr. Rogers first told you or told you that he first
realized that an accident was going to occur~''
which was objected to that it assumed Rogers told him
something. And then at page 156 counsel ragain offends
by going into it -again and ·characterized it as

'' * * * where he (Rogers) told you he first
saw, realized that there w~as going to he an accident."
A further objection is m~de and the trial court left it
up to the witness to say whether or not he had been
misquoted and the witness said, ''No, that's the question
we ask every driver, Judge."
So, the argument might be well made that the witness cleared up the whole thing with a negative and
then a positive, exactly opposite to each other, and also
that we are being hypertechnical in the extreme. But
the sco~e of :the questions, the manner in which counsel
changed them from time to time, first from ''there may
he'' to ''there was going to be'' and then from 'a question by the witness to the appellant to a flat footed
statem~nt by the appellant that he ''realized there was
going to be an accident,'' all show the vice of this kind
of interrogation.
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How much damage these questions did is speculative; it is apparent the trial court was paying no p1articular attention to what was going on, an·d it is also
apparent that counsel persisted in improper questions
and that they gained in their degree of imp·ropriety 1as
he proceeded. But it is clear that the ·above illustrates
one way how not to conduct a lawsuit.
A careful reading ·of the rest of this witness' testimony will show thaf counsel continually led the wit-•
ness (who was perfectly friendly to the plaintiff's cause
as indicated by his testimony), that some objections
were made and that some were sustained. As a practical
proposition, it is poor tactics before a jury to continually
made objections that questions are leading or suggestive, but trial courts should be quick to prevent such
questions on matters of importance~.
It might well be that this court will consider this
matter of insufficient moment by itself to necessitate
a reversal of this cause, but certainly with the other
errors heretofore and hereafter pointed out it indicates
how loosely this case was tried by the trial court, and
how careless he was of the rights of this appell1ant.
The evidence on the last clear chance doctrine

(~oint

lc).

Imme<liately prior to the occurrence of this· accident, the evidence was that the two vehicles were going north on the same side of the road (R 79, 102, 140);
that the bicycle was somewhere in the northbound
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lane between the middle of that lane ~and the east edge
of the highway. Apparently some incident occurred
when the appellant was 78 feet to the rear of the point
of impact which gave him some apprehension of danger
(R 127-131, 254, 182. The de·puty sheriff never question appellant what occurred at this paint. Counsel
for plaintiff never asked him either; . and when appellant's counsel inquired into this matter the appellant testified that at the time the boy was still on the
right side of the highway and was going north (R. 140).
At that time the appellant was beginning to taper off
to the left side of the highway to pass the dece~ased
(R 154, 160 and the map). A fair inference from the
facts, and undoubtedly the worst inference which could
be dr,awn against the appellant, would be that at this
point, when the appellant was 78 feet back of the point
of impact, the boy was changing his position on the
highway. (R. 87, 105, 106), but the boy had not then
started his turn (R. 106, 107). After appellant started
out around deceased, the appel1ant estimated he was
approximately 20 feet behind the boy (R 129), and
appellant stated he honked the horn of his automobile
(R 130), and as he drew alongside of the boy to pass
him, he apparently then beeame ,aware the boy had not
heard the horn of his automobile (R 104, 80). An instant before the collision, when the appellant was not
quite abreast of the boy, the deceased suddenly turned
across the highway and into the car (R 80, 106-108,
142, 266, and Exhibit E). It w~as the :appellant's estiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37
mate that the car moved only 5 feet from the time the
by made the sudden turn until the impact (R 108).
This point of in1pact was 2 feet in from the west edge
of the hard surface of the highway (Map), and the
right front bumper of app·ellant's automobile eame in
contact with the front wheel of the bicycle (R 81, 26'6),
and the boy tipped over. The hoy's body was lying
only a few feet from the point of impact (R 114, Map
181, 189). The appellant in his effort to avoid the boy
turned to his extreme left and went into the ditch
running along the west side of the highway. The appellant's speed at the outset of this sequence of events
was given variously from 20 to 30 miles per hour (R
102, 86, 160) and his speed .at the time he went into
the ditch was approximately 10 to 15 miles per hour
(R 86, 160).
Twice pl:tintiff's counsel elicited from the appellant that "things happened pretty fast'' (R 89) or
"were happening pretty fa~t" (R 132).
At 30 miles per hour the appellant would have
traveled 78 feet in 1.77 seconds and .at 20 miles per
hour he would have traveled this .distance in 2.65 seconds. During this entire period of time the relative
position of the two vehicles was always changing, the
car moving over to the left of the highway to pass,
and the boy moving a little to the left ·and then back
to the right on the e.ast side of the highway, and then
later, suddenly turning to the left as appellant drew
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along side of him. ·On the evidence most unfavorable
to the appellant this entire sequence of events took
place within 2.65 seconds and the period of time from
the point where the hoy suddenly turned until the collision occurred was much shorter, in fact, nearly instantaneous. Appellant stated that his car moved only
5 feet after deceased turned before the collision and
the appellant's wife testified that the deceased was 12
to 14 feet away from the car at the time he turned
( R 108, 266). These distances could be covered by the
respective parties in much less time than a second.
Appellant had a right to rely upon the deceased'~
acting in a prudent and intelligent manner notwithstanding his age, and ·appellant had no reason to anti~
cip~ate the boy would turn without looking or signaling.
The evidence is that the appellant gave the boy adequate room as he came along side (R 80). Under these
c~rcumstances no reasonable person could find that the
appellant at any time had a clear opportunity to avoid
the deceased after having discovered or being aware
that the deceased was in a position of peril from which
he could not extricate himself or of which the deceased
was unaWiare.
In recent decisions of this court the ·elements of
the last clear chance doctrine have been set forth with
great clarity and as we understand them the elements
of that doctrine are: 1. Th·at one party is in a position
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not extricate himself; 2. That the defendant is aware,
not of the other party's existence or presence on the
scene, but, of the other party's peril and of such party's
inability to extricate himself or unaw-areness of the
peril ; 3. That such consciousness on the part of the
defendant must occur early enough in the sequence of
events to afford him a clear opportunity to avoid a
collision through the exercise of ordinary care. It follows from the foregoing, of course, that if either of the
parties has -an equal opportunity to avoid the accident
that the last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable. The
defendant must not only have a clear opportunity to
avoid the accident but the last opp·ol"tunity. Applying
this law to the case at hand, it cannot he said by any
reasonable person that the appellant had at any time
during this sequence of events, the last clear chance
to avoid this collision.
At the time this boy made a sudden turn to the
left the interval of time w-as so short before the collision occurred that it would be impossible for appellant
to avoid striking the boy. As we have stated, the distance the two vehicles were then ap1art could be easily
covered in less than a S'econd of time. A situation som,ewhat similar to this was considered in the case of Van
Dyke v. Atlantic Greyhou;nd Corporation et al, 10 S. E.
(2) 727 which was decided by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina in 1940. In the ease the court stated
the facts to be as follows :
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"Plaintiff's intestate, a boy 14 years of age,
on the morning of August 25, 1939, was riding a
bicycle on the highway near the corporate limits
of the City of Henderson, proceeding eastwardly
on the Louisburg Road. The day was clear and
the road was level and straiglit. The defendant,
the Atlantic Greyhound Corporation,_ was operating two large buses on the highway, both proceeding in the same direction as plaintiff's intestate. The distance between the buses was testified to be 100 feet, though other witnesses estimated this distance at 100 yards. The evidence
tended to fix the speed of the buses at from 25
to 40 miles per hour. Plaintiff's intestate had
delivered a paper to a house on the south side
of the highway, and had ridden back to the highw,ay.

''As the first or front bus approached plaintiff's intestate, he was riding upon the paved
portion of the highway, and when the horn of
the bus was sounded he rode off on the shoulder
of the highway, which was four and a half feet
wide at that point, and was riding three feet from
the edge of the pavement. As the second bus,
the one following in the rear of the first, atproached, plaintiff's intestate suddenly, and
without giving any notice of his intention so to
do, turned to his left on the paved portion of the
road and immediately in front of the bus, where
he was struck and killed. There Wias some evidence that the bus which struck the plaintiff's
intestate ·did n·ot sound the horn until too late,
and that just as the boy came on the pavement
immediately in front of the bus, a distance estimated at 15 or 20 feet, the driver of the bus
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turned sharply to his left to avoid striking the
boy, but 'the extreme right front corner' of the
bus 'mashed in' the left side of the bicycle, causing the death of plaintiff's intestate. The bus
ran off into the ditch on the left of the highway.''
And quoted as follows from one of the witnesses:
"'When the boy ran up on the paved portion
of the highway in front of the bus (the bus)
must have been not more than 15 feet from him.
If he had looked to the left at all before he went
on the paved highway there was nothing to keep
him from seeing the bus. ' ''
After considering the facts of the case the court
stated as follows:
"While the testimony relating to this unfortunate occurrence, taken in the light most favorable for the plaintiff, might tend to show some
negligence on the part of ·defendants, a careful
consideration of all the evidence offered by plaintiff leads us to the conclusion that the f1ailure
of plaintiff's intestate to exercise due care and
precaution for his own safety must be held to
constitute the sole proximate cause, or at least
a proximate contributing cause, of his injury
and death. There was no evidence which would
permit an inference other than that the hoy,
without signal or warning, and apparently without looking or seeing the oncoming bus, turned
suddenly in front of the bus at a time when, in
spite of the efforts of the driver, it was too late
to avoid striking the bicycle. There are no circumstance·s here which would relieve the plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tiff's intestate of the conclusive imputation of
contributory negligence. * * * '' (citing cases)
"It will be noted that under our motor vehicle statutes a bicycle is deemed a vehicle, and
the rider of a bicycle upon the highway is subject to the applicable provisions of the statutes
relating to motor vehicles. Public Laws, 1939,

Ch. 275.
'' There was no evidence to support plaintiff's plea seeking to invoke the principle of last
clear chance. Morris v. Transportation Co., 208
N. C. 807, 182 S. E. 487; Haynes v. Southern R. R.
Co., 182 N. C. 679, 110 S. E. 56. There was no
evidence that more than a fraction of a second
elapsed after plaintiff turned on to the pavement before the collision between the bus and the
bicycle occurred. Nor was there evidence that
there was anything to indicate to the driver of
defendant's bus that plaintiff's intestate was in
a position of peril, or that he intended to turn to
his- left upon the pavement in front of the bus.''
(Citing cases)
In this case just prior to the boy's making a sudden turn the app·ellant was angling around him, had
honked his horn and the boy was somewhere to his
right and forw-ard of him, on the east side of the highway. At this point we submit that the boy was not
in a position of peril and as this court so aptly stated
in the case of Holmgren v. Union Pac. ~. R. Co., 198
Pacific (2) 459, at page 463, in quoting from a Calif·
ornia ease, the hoy must be in a position of peril not
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approacking one; we quote :

"It is also significant to note that the 'situation of danger' or 'position of danger,' referred
to in the authorities dealing with the last clear
chance doctrine, is reached only when a plaintiff,
moving toward the path of an on coming t:r"~ain or
vehicle, has reached a position 'from which he
cannot escape by the exercise ·or ordinary care.'
In other words, it is not enough, under the last
clear chance. doctrine, that the plaintiff is merely
approaching a p·osition of danger, for wntil he has
reached a position of danger, he has the same opportu;nity to avoid the acci~ent by the exercise of
ordinary care, as·has the defendant. In such cases,
the ordinary rules of negligence and contributory
negligence apply, rather than the exceptional doctrine of last clear chance. It is only in cases in
which, after plaintiff reaches a position of danger,
defendant has a last clear chance to avoid the accident by the exercise of or.dinary care, and plaintiff has no similar chance, .that the doctrine is aplicable." (The court's italics.)
And the court discusses this qualification further on
page 464 by stating that the defendant must have had
the last charnce and also had a clear chance to avoid
the accident.
Under the facts and circumstances in this case
the deceas·ed had an opportunity at any time up to the
point at which he made his sudden turn to the left to
avoid the collision with ap·pellant's automobile. Under
such circumstances the last clear chance doctrine is
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not ~applicable. See Richardson et al v. R'ibosso, (Calif.)
8 Pacific ( 2) 226, at page 227, where the court said:
'' The evidence, however, does riot bring the
case within the rule where the last clear chance
doctrine becomes applicable, a rule which limits
its application to a ease where the person injured
is known to be in a place of peril from which he
cannot extricate himself by the exercise of ordinary care. * * * The liability is pl·aced upon
the party inflicting the injury only if immediately
before the actual infliction of .the injury the injured person was in such a situation as to be
unable, by the exercise on his part of reasonable
and ordinary care to extricate himself, and vigil)ance on his part would not have averted the ~n
jury." And cases cited. (Italics ours).
If .this boy had looked up at any time during this
sequence of events, there was nothing to prevent him
from seeing the car which was in the act of passing
him and the boy's mere looking would have been sufficient to avoid the accident be·cause all he w~ould have
had to do w~as. continue in a direct line to the north
instead of turning- and no collision would have occurred.
See Graham v. Johnson, 166 Pacific (2) 230, at column 2 page 236.
We think it appropriate to call to the court's ~at
tention that in three successive decisions of this court
involving the last clear chance doctrine in which there
were moving vehicles involved, this court has set up
a further limitation upon the use of that doctrine. We
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refer to Hickok v. Skinner, 190 Pacific (2d) 514, at
page 517, where the court said:
''The last clear chance doctrine, relied on by
plaintiff, is inapplicable in the present instance.
As has been repeatedly announced by this court,
this doctrine is of limited application in the case
of two moving vehicles.''
This matter was further
ton, 213 P·acific ( 2d) 356 :

~asserted

in Giren v. Nor-

* * * ''It has oft been held by this court that
the doctrine is of limited application in cases involving two moving vehicles. The soundness of
this rule is apparent when it is appreciated that
the .doctrine only applies when the ·defendant has
reasonable time and opportunity to avoid the
accident. Stated in another way, the plaintiff
only escapes the consequenees of his own negligence when the defendant has a clear chance to
avoid the accident.''
French vs. Utah Oil Refining Company, 216 Pacific (2d) 1002 is to the same effect.
In all three of the above cases the situations under
consideration were the crossing of an intersection or
turning left through approaching traffic. We believe
the aforementioned limitation is applicable to a case
where one vehicle attempts to pass another and the
vehicle being passed is suddenly turned from direct
lane of travel across the path of the p1assing car. In
all three of these types of cases the situation change8
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so rapidly and the relative positions of the vehicles
is so different from time to time that there is no reasonable opportunity for a party to appreci~ate the peril
and to avoid the collision. The policy behind such a
limitation of the doctrine of last clear chance has been
stated by this court in Graham v. Johnson, on rehearing, 172 Pacific ( 2) 665, 109 Utah 365 as follows:

* * * ''When one party thrusts upon another
the onus of ~avoiding an accident which was due
entirely to the fact that the first party is in the
fairly rapid process of placing himself in the path
of a car driven by the second party, the court,
before it permits the jury to determine whether
the second party could have avoided the accident, must be reasonably sure that there was
time enough for the jury to so find. Where the
situation is, to reasonable minds, so doubtful as
to whether the second party had time to avoid
it, the matter should not be given to the jury;
otherwise, we are, as said in the case of Thomas
v. ,Sadleir, Utah, 162 P. 2d 112, 115, in grave
danger of permitting the one really at 'fault to
shift the blame for the accident on the other by
accentuation of the other's duty to avoid the effect of the first one's negligence.' "
This quotation was cited with approval in V.an
Wagoner v·. Union Pacific R. Co., 186 Pacific (2) 293,
at bottom of ·page 301.
We submit that the plaintiff did not prove the most
necessary element to invoke the doctrine of last clear
chance. We quote :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

47

• * * "One should not be held liable for failing to avoid the effect of the other's negligence in
a situation where it is speculative as to whether
he \vas afforded a clear opportunity to avoid it.
In a situation where both parties are on the move
the significance of the word 'clear' is most important. Otherwise we may put the onus of avoiding the effect of one's negligence on a party not
negligent. That party's negligence only arises
when it is definitely established that there was
ample time and opportunity to avoid the accident
which was not taken advantage of.'' Italics ours.

Graham v. Johnson (first decision) 166 Pacific (2)

230, at 237, 238, 109 Utah 346.
The instruction on the last clear chance doctrine (Point 3d).
The argument we have made in the immediate
foregoing portion of this brief is pertinent here. We
do not think there was any place in the case for in .
struction No. 14 (R 29) at all, which was excepted to
at R 293. Under the evidence there was no question
present for the jury to decide, and consequently it was
reversible error to give an instruction on the doctrine.
It is also our contention that the instruction itself
is bad in substance, and as it was framed and given
to the jury it did not appraise the jury· of the proper
elements of the law with respect to the doctrine of
the last clear chance. We rely for reversal on this
ground on the following propositions:
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1. There is no evidence in the record showing
the deceased w~as unable to extricate himself from a
perilous position, until he made his sudden turn, and
from that point we concede that neither one of the
parties could do anything. The last paragraph of instruction No. 14 should not have been given.
It is apparent from the evidence that up until the
time he made his sudden turn Gary Morby could have
avoided the collision by looking around, because he
then would have seen the appellant ahout to pass him
and could have continued- north on the highway in
safety. This is not the case of a man who ''goes to
sleep on ia railroad track or gets his foot caught in a
frog,'' and cannot therefor extricate himself or by
"alertness avoid the danger," Graham v. Johnson
(first hearing), supra, 166 Pacific (2) 230, at 235,
where the court discusses the provisions of section 479
of Restatement of Torts. Rather, this is the situation
this court warned was not covered by the doctrine at
page 236, column 2, bottom portion, of the above case.
2. The instruction as a whole fails to give due
weight to the significance of the requirement that the
jury find that the appellant have a last chance ~and a
clear opportunity to avoid the collision after being
aware that deceased was in a position of peril; and in
this connection the court's statement ''then you are
instructed that the defendant Walter Lawrence Rogers
had the last clear chance to avoid the collision" took
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that question from the jury and is in effect a comment
on the evidence.
This is a case like Gra·ham v. Johnson, supr.a1, where
the situation was constantly changing, and we believe
the law as to an instruction as therein set out is applicable here.
We quote from the Court's first decision 1n that
case at pages 237 and 238 of 166 Pacific (2):

* * * "In a case such as this

whe~

both parties are more or less rapidly changing their positions the evidence must be clear and convincing
that the party whom it is c1aime·d could have
avoided the accident had a ''clear'' ch.ance to do
so.

* * * ''the jury must be instructed that it
should be clearly convinced in such a case that
she (defendant) was far enough north of him
(plaintiff) ~as to give her a clear chance to avoid
the accident.'' * * *

* * * "In those intermediate situations such
as the supposition under the evidence that Darlene was coming down on the far ·west side of the
street where the court is in doubt as to whether
all reasonable minds could conclude one way or
the other he should submit the case to the jury
with instructions that it should be clearly convinced that the defendant had a clear chance, viz.,
ample opp·ortunity or clearly an existing ability
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ciated the plaintiff's danger, to avoid harming
him; otherwise it (the jury) should find for the
defendant.
''From our recitals of the evidence and our
exposition of the 1aw, it is apparent that the jury
must be given an opportunity to determine what
the facts of the case really are, and that it must
be armed by instructions from the court in accordance with the law herein laid down to apply
the proper law to the fact situation or situations
as it finds them." (Italics and words in brackets
ours).
3. That the phrase ''even though both parties
were negligent and even though the negligence of both
parties concurred in eausing the death of Gary Morby",
being the last lines of instruction No. 14, is not a law,
and would allow the jury to find a verdict for the plain.
tiff without their finding that the appellant's failure,
if any, to avail himself of his opportunity to avoid
the collision was the sole proxim·ate cause of the acci.
dent, which is a necessary element for the jury to find
before plaintiff can recover.
The law does not permit a recovery where two
parties' negligence concur in an injury, and the last
clear c~ance doctrine is no exception to this, because
the theory of the. doctrine is that defendant's negligence, in failing to avoid the plaintiff, is the sole cause
of the accident. We again cite Graha1n v. Johnson
(first decision). The Court at page 236 of 166 Pacific
(2) after assuming a situation \vhere tvvo parties are
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negligent, states:

* * * ''Both up to that point might be guilty.
of negligence and neither he able to recover
against the other. But if the oncoming driver
(the defendant), realizing the situation of the
plaintiff, had 1a clear opportunity to avoid the accident and failed to utilize it, that counts just as
if the plaintiff had not been negligent, and the
defendant had been. An incorrect but rather
dramatic day of putting it is that defendant's
first negligence and plaintiff's negligence cancel
out leaving only defendant's failure to utilize his
opportunity to avoid the accident as the negligen-ce. The first and only negligence which is the
basis of recovery under the clear chance doctrine
is this failure of the defendant to avoid the harm,
having the knowledge and ability to do so.''
This language here complained of strikes the entire instruction down, and permits a recovery without
any last clear chance. It takes from the defendant any
defens'e of contributory negligence.

C-ONCLUSION
If this court determines that Gary Morby at the
time of this accident was under the -duty of obeying
the statutory requirements set forth in S·ection 57-7-133,
this case should be rev.ers·ed. The co·urt by its instruction No. 12 stated in effect that that s~atute did not
apply to Gary Morby. By its refusal to give appellant's
request No. 1, or some similar instruction, the court
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held that that statute did not apply to. Gary Morby.
This is contrary to the law.
If this court holds that the appellant was not negligent or tha.t the decedent's negligence proximately contributed to the accident, then this cas·e should be reversed with instructions to set the judgment aside and
enter judgment for the appellant, no cause of action.

We respectfully submit that the trial court tried
this case on a theory not tenable under the law and
permitted the jury to decide it on a theory not tenable
in law.

EDGAR C. JENSEN
ROBERT A. BURNS
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